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WILL THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS FUEL A RETURN TO RACIAL POLICIES
THAT DENY HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AND WEALTH?
By: Marcia Johnson 1
Introduction
Property ownership in America
has traditionally been linked to power and
wealth.2 French political historian Alexis
de Tocqueville observed, “[T]he love of
property is keener in the United States
than it is anywhere else, and Americans
therefore display less inclination toward
doctrines that threaten, in any way, the
way property is owned.”3 Property-related
wealth comes in many forms, including
the right to control tangible assets such
as land and buildings.4 Homeownership
today remains the single greatest source
of wealth and symbol of well-being for
most Americans.5
Owning a home facilitates access
to numerous privileges and opportunities
borne from government law and policy,
including tax credits, increased credit
options, and increased worth and wealth.
Homeownership also increases the value
of communities, neighborhoods, and the
homes themselves. It allows for better
educational opportunities, social mobility,
and community stability.6 Therefore, it is
particularly signiﬁcant that government
housing policies and practices have
historically stiﬂed the opportunity of
African Americans to own and retain
real property. The consequences of
these discriminatory policies continue to
be dire.
The ultimate aspiration of
nearly every American family is to own
a home.7 For many African American
families this was still a near unattainable
goal for more than one hundred years
after the Emancipation Proclamation
was signed.8 Government policies that
excluded many African Americans from
access to homeownership in the 1930s
began changing in the late 1970s, leading
many to anticipate an increase in African
American homeownership.9 However,
in the years between the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 and
1995, the rate actually dropped 2.6%.10
Still, the CRA likely opened the door for
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post-1995 programs that provided easier
access to credit, down payment assistance,
and deferred mortgage payments.
Indeed, more aggressive policies begun
under Presidents Clinton’s administration
provided greater opportunities, resulting
in a rate increase in African American
homeownership from 42% in 1995 to
47.4% by 2008.11
Perhaps the greatest threat
to the continued realization of the
American dream is the latest economic
crisis rooted in the sub-prime mortgage
collapse.12 Some blame the CRA of
1977 for creating a market that they
claim provided housing loans to noncreditworthy borrowers – particularly
African American families – in the low
and moderate income range.13 However,
this charge is without direct factual
support as the post-CRA period saw a
decline in homeownership for African
Americans but a mild increase for White
homeowners.14 Illegal and fraudulent
practices in property appraisals and
income reporting directed program
beneﬁts away from those the program
was meant to aid.
Nevertheless, of the more
than 3.6 million mortgage foreclosures
projected to occur during the January
2007 - December 2009 period, up to
39% are sub-prime mortgages.15 Subprime mortgages were far more popular
with African American homebuyers than
any other group, particularly from 1995to-2005.16 Although mortgage failures
certainly pose an economic problem,
it is not enough to have caused the
collapse of 2008 or to support a return
to housing policies that effectively deny
homeownership opportunities to African
American buyers.
Even recent government action
to stunt such a return suggests that there
were other sources of the collapse, beside
African American homeownership, or
other sub-prime mortgages. For example,
in 2008, the United States government
approved a $750,000,000,000 bail-

out of ﬁnancial institutions ostensibly
due to the collapse in the sub-prime
markets.17 Had the government instead
paid every mortgagee the full amount of
their initial mortgage loan, assuming a
$200,000 loan average, the government
could have purchased all bad mortgage
debt for $720,000,000,000.18 100% of
foreclosures from 2007 to 2008 would
be paid. If only sub-prime mortgages
were covered, the government could
have paid all such foreclosures from
2006 through 2008.19
It is common for markets to rise
into bubbles, for the bubbles to burst, and
for industries proﬁting from the bubbles
to fail. However, it is not common
for the burst to lead to the collapse of
the entire global market. In the 1980s,
savings and loans fell at a cost of about
$152.9 billion with taxpayers paying 82%
or $126 billion. In the early 2000s, the
technology industry bubble burst.20 Still,
none of these industry failures caused
the world market to crater.
This paper is written to examine
the potential effect of the market
collapse on our nation’s homeownership
policies.
Part I reviews America’s
historical housing and homeownership
policies. Part II considers the expansion
of
homeownership
opportunities
to
historically
non-participating
communities, particularly the African
American community. Part III reviews
the culprits of the economic crash
of 2008 and explains why sub-prime
borrowers often get blamed.
Part
IV examines solutions to maintain
America’s pro-homeownership policy,
and Part V concludes that America’s
homeownership policy should continue
to be vigorously pursued with a goal
of including African Americans who
have long been excluded by government
policies and sanctions from building
wealth and thereby stabilizing their
communities.
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Part I: The History of America’s
Housing Policy
The American government has
historically attended to the housing needs
of citizens who are unable to purchase
homes. Since the 1700s, the housing
needs of the poor have been addressed
through formal systems including the
provision of “outdoor relief,” “boarding
out,” almshouses and asylums. As people
began moving away from small seaport
towns21 and farms to cities in the 1900s,22
increased housing demand23 caused a
20-year building boom in urban areas.24
This boom turned bust during the late
1930s largely as a result of the Great
Depression when many Americans could
afford neither to rent nor purchase a
home.25 It was the Industrial Revolution
that rejuvenated the development of
American cities.26
The late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries marked the
beginning of housing development
within residential subdivisions.27 To
assure both peaceful enjoyment of one’s
property and to maintain property value,
developers and home buyers purportedly
sought legal control mechanisms that
would aid in protecting and preserving
their property interests.28 Developers of
these subdivisions relied on restrictive
covenants, equitable servitudes, negative
easements and zoning ordinances to
ensure separation within residential,
commercial, and industrial areas.29 The
more sinister goal of these devices was
to divide people based on economic,
social, and racial lines.30 Still, these new
communities represented an expanded
housing market driven by the growing
need for homes.
The federal government sought
to address the expanding need for lowcost homes through the Housing Division
of the Public Works Administration
(PWA), which constructed public-owned
housing units.31 Through the PWA, the
government took control of privately
owned land for the public purpose of
providing housing to those who could
not otherwise afford it. The seizure of
land during this period was later found
to be a wrongful exercise of the federal
26

government’s eminent domain power.32
As a consequence, construction under
this program ended, but the government’s
ability to create housing opportunities
ﬂourished.33
The United States Housing
Act of 1937 (USHA)34 was the ﬁrst
national housing program and its
goal was “to provide ‘a decent home
in a suitable environment for every
American Family…’”.35 In the 1940s,
the federal government began providing
low-interest ﬁnancing through both the
Federal Housing (FHA) and Veterans’
Administrations (VA) in keeping with this
federal housing goal. When American
soldiers returned home from World War
II, the nation’s policy of homeownership
continued to expand.36 Homeownership
rates increased from about 45% to 65%
after World War II due to government
policies that increased access to credit and
introduced innovative lending products,
like the thirty-year ﬁxed mortgage to the
middle class.37
USHA was controversial at
the time and was challenged as an
unconstitutional intrusion by the
government in the private market.38 The
United States Supreme Court found the
Act within Congress’ power to provide
for the public’s general welfare.39 This
decision would have a compelling impact
on housing opportunities in America, as
USHA authorized the federal government
to pay the principal and interest on taxexempt bonds, enabling the construction
of public housing developments for lowincome individuals.40 However, USHA
was not an equal housing program, and
assistance within the program operated
on a racially-segregated basis.41
Between 1937 and 1949, middleincome Americans began moving outside
the central cities and into suburban areas,
resulting in diminished homeownership
opportunities in urban areas. Many of
these urban areas became infested with
slums and public housing. Congress
reacted to this growing problem by
passing the United States Housing Act
of 1949,42 which is often touted as being
the nation’s ﬁrst ofﬁcial housing policy.43
The policy was designed to remedy
housing shortages, eliminate substandard

housing, and provide a reasonable living
environment for every American.44
The policy had three major objectives:
(1) to encourage private development
in the housing market; (2) to provide
governmental assistance to enable
private enterprise; and (3) to fuel local
governments in developing programs to
help improve cities and housing.45 The
Housing Act of 1949 authorized urban
redevelopment and provided for the
construction of 810,000 new housing
units in six years.46
This Act had a decidedly negative
impact on African Americans because
it forced them to move from their
homes as construction began, only to
be placed on long waiting lists for public
rental housing.47 In addition, although
the federal government’s original plan
was to revive urban communities, the
government’s interest in the program, as
well as the available funding, decreased
rapidly.48 Consequently, many of the
completed units were substandard,
meeting only basic housing necessities.49
The fact that African Americans
were not permitted to beneﬁt from
government-provided low-interest loans
only exacerbated the plan’s negative
impact. For example, racially disparate
application of the FHA/VA loan
programs, meant to encourage national
homeownership, magniﬁed and enforced
economic and racial separation.50 As a
result, the government created a twotiered system of affordable housing: the
upper tier consisted of FHA and VA
home acquisition loans while the lower
tier was comprised of public housing
rental programs.51
Under this two-tier system,
minority and low-income families were
placed in public housing rental programs,
while Whites and other preferred classes
were given FHA or VA home loans
for homeownership.52 Even African
Americans that met the qualifying criteria
for loans were generally unsuccessful
because the homes they could afford
were located in neighborhoods that
were predominately comprised of
minorities and thus considered risky
investments.53
As urbanization
continued to rise, fear, ignorance, and
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hatred propelled political groups toward
considering race and class as factors
when constructing planning devices
and promulgating new housing laws.54
Deliberate policies favoring segregation
successfully divided classes and races.55
Even after laws prohibited segregation,
signiﬁcant racial transition within White
neighborhoods often caused Whites to
vacate these once segregated white areas,
resulting in segregated African American
neighborhoods.56
In 1968, the United States
Congress committed “to meet all of the
nation’s housing needs and eliminate all
of its substandard housing.”57 Congress
acknowledged that not only had
Americans failed to live up to the national
commitment, but that the burden of that
failure was borne primarily by the poor.58
This new housing policy made clear that
it was designed to address the needs
of all Americans, including the poor.
The Housing Act states: “It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United
States to promote the general welfare of
the nation . . . to . . . remedy the unsafe
and unsanitary housing conditions and
the acute shortage of safe, decent and
sanitary dwellings for families of lowincome . . . .”59 This national policy laid
the foundation for the government’s
role in providing housing and housing
opportunities for low-income people.60
More than one hundred years
after the Emancipation Proclamation
freed slaves in America, Congress
banned racial discrimination in housing
practices. Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, also known as the Fair
Housing Act (FHA),61 the Equal Credit
Opportunities Act (ECOA), the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
and the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), were all measures designed to
ensure equal housing opportunities to
all Americans. The FHA was a more
comprehensive law addressing housing62
and prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, religion,
sex, disability, and family status in real
estate transactions.63 Similarly, the 1974
ECOA prohibits discriminatory lending
practices based on sex, marital status, race,
religion, national origin, age, and receipt
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of public assistance.64 Discrimination
is further prohibited in consumer credit
transactions under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act.65 Later, the HMDA was enacted to
require lending institutions to publicly
disclose loan information to ensure racial
equality in home mortgage lending.66
Despite all these legislative
efforts to ensure equal housing
opportunities,
Congress found it
necessary to take additional steps to
encourage ﬁnancial institutions to
meet the credit needs of traditionally
neglected communities by enacting
the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 (CRA).67 Banks historically took
consumer deposits but failed to provide
access to credit, particularly for minority
and low-income communities. The goal
of the CRA was to ensure that ﬁnancial
institutions would reinvest deposits back
into these communities. Under CRA,
supervisory agencies were given the
authority to deny banks the opportunity
to merge, relocate, open a new ofﬁce or
close a particular branch if they failed to
comply with CRA demands.68
In 1989, the Financial Institution
Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) was enacted to strengthen CRA
enforcement by requiring publication of
CRA ratings. Banks were obligated to
meet the credit needs of the communities
they served but were also obligated to
disclose their performance record by
making available the written evaluations
prepared by regulatory agencies.69 This
disclosure requirement gave community
organizations the leverage to ensure
that ﬁnancial institutions were FIRREA
compliant.
In 1994, in an effort to
improve both community development
and the accessibility of capital within
deteriorating communities, Congress
passed the Community Development
Banking and Financial Institutions Act
(CDBFIA).70 This legislation established
a “fund” that would aid in providing
economic support to new and existing
Community Development Financial
Institutions (CDFIs).71 A CDFI is an
institution whose primary purpose is to

promote economic development, equity
investments, and loans to persons within
a speciﬁed target area.72 CDFIs are
important to increasing homeownership
because they are specialized ﬁnancial
institutions that work in communities
or markets that traditional ﬁnancial
institutions have not adequately served.73
CDFIs include community development
banks, credit unions, loan funds, venture
capital funds, and micro-entrepreneurial
loan funds. CDFIs provide numerous
services including mortgage ﬁnancing
for ﬁrst time home buyers, ﬁnancing for
needed community facilities, commercial
loans and investments to start or expand
small businesses, loans to rehabilitate
rental housing, and ﬁnancial services
needed by low income households and
local businesses. These institutions also
provide services to ensure that credit
is used effectively, such as technical
assistance to small businesses and credit
counseling to consumers.74
The Home Ownership for
People Everywhere (“HOPE”) programs
of the 1980s and 1990s added another
dimension to the federal housing policy,
which previously focused on rental units.
HOPE reoriented American housing
policy
towards
homeownership.75
Reafﬁrmed by Presidents Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush, this expanded
policy embodied the belief that enhanced
homeownership serves the public
interest, and justiﬁes the use of public
dollars to achieve this goal.76
Part II: Expanding Homeownership
Opportunities to African
Americans and Other Historically
Disenfranchised Populations
Some theorists suggest that
the American policy of increasing
homeownership to poorer populations
and expanding mortgages was the single
biggest contributor to the destruction
of the global market economy.77 Due,
in part, to America’s renewed focus on
homeownership, the share of Americans
who owned homes rose from 64% in 1994
to 69% in 2005. These new homeowners
were largely low- and moderate-income
families and minorities. Over that same
27

time period, the homeownership rate in
the lowest tenth of the income scale rose
4 %, the second lowest rose 4 %, and the
rates for African Americans and Latinos
rose 7 and 8 %, respectively. About
12 million new homeowners emerged,
roughly half of them African Americans,
Latinos, and others of mixed race. By
2005, the United States occupied the top
rung in world homeownership rates.78
Poverty, Income and Homeownership
A large part of the population
remains beyond the reach of traditional
ﬁnance vehicles. Almost 20 % of all
children in the U.S. live in poverty.79
Poverty has a substantial impact on the
quality of education to which children
have access.
Although numerous
programs and policies exist to ensure
that all children—regardless of race
or economic background—have equal
educational opportunities, a substantial
number of children living in poverty
endure inferior student services and
substandard facilities. These conditions
help create a cycle of poorly housed
renters who contribute less overall to the
good of society than do better trained
citizens. Poor families often face barriers
that restrict their ability to improve their
socio-economic status. For example,
the ability to move to communities with
better educational opportunities is not
an option for many poor families. A
majority of these families are renters
and cannot afford rent or purchase
prices in suburban or well-to-do urban
neighborhoods. Statistics support this
observation. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau (Bureau), in 2002, about
56% of American families (owners
and renter combined) could afford to
purchase a modestly priced80 home in
the area in which they lived.81 Among
families that were current homeowners
approximately 75% could afford to
purchase a modestly priced home while
only 10% of those families who rented
could afford to purchase such a home.82
Since the late 1940s, the
Bureau has surveyed and reported on
the distribution of income among U.S.
citizens.83 According to the Bureau’s
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studies, family income inequality
decreased by 7.4 % from 1947 to 1968,84
But income inequality increased by 24.4
% between 1968 and 1998.85 The income
difference between households in the 95th
percentile and those in the 20th percentile
increased from approximately $96,000 in
1994 to over $127,000 in 2000.86
From 1999 to 2000, the median
household income held at $42,100,87 the
poverty rate in fell to the lowest it had
been since 1979,88 and the number of
poor persons fell.89 African American
and Latino incomes rose as poverty90
rates for these two groups fell,91 but
their income still lagged far behind
that of Whites.92 Further, poverty
rates for African American and femaleheaded households reached their lowest
recorded level in 2000.93 Nevertheless a
1989 National Research Council study
reported that the standard of living for
African Americans lagged far behind
that of Whites94 and showed that African
American unemployment rates were
more than two times that of Whites.95
Even in 2008, the African American
unemployment rate was still more than
two times that of Whites.96
All this demonstrates that
while the standard of living for African
Americans has improved, a substantial
number of African American, Latino,
and female-headed households continue
to live in poverty at disturbing rates
today. While the income gap between
African Americans and Whites decreased
in 2006, by 2007 the gap returned and, a
2007 Bureau report found that over 22%
of all African American families still
have incomes below the ofﬁcial poverty
line.97
The Impact of Poverty on Homeownership
Statistics show that a thriving
home mortgage market needs to rely
on untapped— increasingly poor and
minority—borrowers.
In 1991, the
Bureau reported that 57 % of American
families could not afford a median priced
home in the area in which they lived.98
African Americans and Latinos made up
three-quarters of these families.99 Four
years later, the Bureau reported that 80

% of African American and Latino nonhomeowner families, almost double that
of White families,100 could not afford a
median-priced home in the area in which
they lived.101 By 2004, Bureau reports
indicate homeownership rates for Whites
was 76.2 % while African Americans and
Latinos had homeownership rates of
49.1 and 48.7 %, respectively.102 Overall
homeownership rates in 2009 were at
67.6%.103
True comparisons of racial and
ethnic disparity in homeownership rates
are more difﬁcult because the Census
Bureau changed the way it reported race
in 2003.104 Using current race and ethnic
standards, however, we can compare
2006 to 2009 rates of homeownership.
The homeownership rates for Whites
(non-Latinos) were about 76 % in 2006
and about 75 % in 2009. For African
Americans, the rates were about 48 %
in 2006 and about 46 % in 2009, and
for Latinos (of any race), the rates were
about 49.5 % in 2006 and 48.7 % in
2009. 105
In 2002, the Pew Institute
reported that the median net worth was
$88,651 for White households, $7,932
for Latino households, and $5,988 for
African American households,106 and
that home equity was the key component
of household wealth, accounting
for two-thirds of mean net worth.107
Public policy tends to support reaching
out to these latter two ‘untapped’
communities of potential homebuyers
for a number of reasons. In addition to
strengthening community development,
homeownership is one of the principal
means by which low-income families
acquire wealth. Traditionally, home
purchases were thought to be good
investments because they allowed
homeowners to build long term assets,108
while also resulting in assets that
homeowners could borrow against in
the short term. Policy considerations
also include the
recognition that
neighborhood environment affects
the general welfare of the nation and
that homeownership has the potential
to catalyze community growth,
development,
and
stabilization.109
Community stability in turn tends to
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increase property values.110
Moreover, racial and ethnic
homeownership disparity has disturbing
implications for a nation that is
increasingly diverse, and this disparity
played an important role in the decision
to increase homeownership opportunities
for these communities.111 The Bush
White House initiative of 2000 included
a goal to increase the number of minority
homeowners by at least 5.5 million by
2010.112 The initiative also included
an identiﬁcation of the barriers that
many minorities faced when seeking to
purchase a home as well as strategies to
overcome the barriers. One of the most
signiﬁcant barriers to implementing this
initiative proved to be ﬁnancial.113
Identifying the Financial Barriers114
The White House identiﬁed
numerous
ﬁnancial
barriers
to
homeownership, including inability to
make down payments, limited access
to credit, poor credit histories, limited
mortgage products, regulatory burdens,
and lack of access to ﬁnancing in
general.
The federal government
then launched efforts to help targeted
borrowers overcome these barriers.115 It
was apparent that home loans were not
unavailable per se but were unattainable
for many Americans. This lack of access
can be attributed to a number of things,
including racial barriers that remain
rooted in society.
Denying Access
“Redlining” is one method of
denying people access to ﬁnancing and
refers to the practice of outlining in red
those areas on a map to which ﬁnancial
institutions are unwilling to extend
their credit services. These areas tend
to include primarily minority and lowincome borrowers. Although inequality
and housing discrimination has existed for
centuries in our nation,116 banks initiated
the practice of redlining in the 1960s117
after race riots brought inequality to the
forefront of national concern.118 The
federal government began to pay more
attention to America’s legally-sanctioned
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discriminatory housing practices. The
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is
often hailed as an act against redlining.119
Although redlining is no longer a
blatant practice, lenders continued to
issue loans on a discriminatory basis by
using marketing strategies that targeted
borrowers based on race and adopting
inequitable institutional policies.120 Many
lenders who offered prime loans neither
marketed nor solicited applications from
minority or low-income applicants,121
with the exception of sub-prime
alternatives offered in compliance with
CRA requirements.
One scholar has identiﬁed
racial redlining as a barrier to African
Americans’ ability to accumulate wealth
because it restricts their participation
in the marketplace as home sellers and
buyers. Banks use racial redlining to deny
access to credit so that a prospective buyer
would not qualify for a home mortgage,
in fact, “in a study conducted by the
Federal Reserve Board, [it was reported
that] ‘banks reject African Americans
‘for home loans 80% more often than
equally qualiﬁed Whites.’ This rampant
discrimination
disadvantages Blacks
and contributes to the poverty cycle.”122
Moreover, African-Americans who reside
within identiﬁably African American
neighborhoods were historically redlined
out of the mainstream mortgage
market and forced to rely instead on
sub prime loans and predatory lending
practices. The effect of securing loans
through these more expensive markets
also impacts the homebuyer’s ability
to purchase homeowner’s insurance.123
The FHA created two housing
markets between the early 1930s and
the 1960s by systematically excluding
African Americans from lower priced,
conventional mortgages.124 The FHA
rated loan applicants from most
desirable “A” to least desirable “D”.
“A” neighborhoods were principally
or exclusively white, native-born
professionals and “D” neighborhoods
were not.”125 In 1950, the FHA only
granted 5% of conventional loans to
non-Whites thereby limiting low-cost
mortgages to Whites. FHA-redlined
neighborhoods
encouraged
racial

segregation and their monopoly on
the mortgage market meant that any
exclusion from the program constituted
exclusion from the housing market.126
The CRA is to some extent responsible
for the decreased disparity between
loans awarded to Whites and those
awarded to minorities.127 Although there
has been some decrease, minorities are
increasingly and disproportionately
serviced by sub-prime lenders.128 Even
afﬂuent African Americans are twice
as likely to reﬁnance in the sub-prime
market as low-income Whites.129 With the
skyrocketing rate of immigration, home
ownership in immigrant communities
has risen on the priority list of many
lending and governmental institutions.
As immigrants buy homes at an everincreasing rate, unscrupulous lenders
will frequently target them, because they
often lack a sophisticated understanding
of the American mortgage system. This
is especially true for non-ﬂuent English
speakers who fall prey to predatory
lenders who impose exploitative loan
terms and conditions.130
Sub-prime lenders tend to target
minorities, low- to moderate-income
borrowers, and borrowers who live in
certain communities that are considered
high risk. These communities are also
most likely to be affected by the hardships
associated with predatory lending, such
as high interest rates, unreasonable fee
scales,131 loss of home equity, and even
social and psychological problems.132
In some cases, these lenders take
advantage of borrowers with excellent
credit histories who may not realize
their eligibility to obtain a prime market
loan133 and direct them instead to subprime loans.134
According to current Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data,
African Americans and Latinos are still
consistently denied credit when applying
for home loans and when reﬁnancing
at rates disproportional to those of
Whites.135
Discriminatory lending
practices in the conventional lending
market continue to expand the subprime mortgage market.
The road to a national policy
of homeownership has been a long one
29

from that time in our nation’s history
when some were denied the opportunity
because of their race. During the last
decade, attempts were made to open
the door of the American dream of
homeownership to all people. One
potential by-product of the 2008 economic
crash is the reversal of homeownership
encouraging policies, but such a reversal
would ignore the underlying problems of
the crash by placing blame on the wrong
culprit. Placing the sole blame upon the
homeownership policy or minority home
buyers would be unfair and inaccurate.
Part III: Homeownership and the
Economic Crash of 2008: Is the
sub-prime borrower to blame?
The sub-prime mortgage
The sub-prime mortgage is
traditionally described as a type of loan
granted to individuals who have poor
credit score histories (often below 600)
that disqualify them from conventional
mortgages.136
Because sub-prime
borrowers present a high risk for lenders,
sub-prime mortgages charge interest
rates above the prime lending rate.137
Borrowers with credit scores above
650 are generally charged a signiﬁcantly
lower rate of interest on their loans
than are charged on sub-prime loans.138
Lower interest rates and high capital
liquidity encouraged lenders to grant
sub-prime loans from 2004 to 2006.
More importantly, lenders sought
additional proﬁts through these higher
risk loans, charging interest rates above
prime to balance against heightened
default risks. More than the government
homeownership policy, it was the
perceived potential for large proﬁts that
motivated lenders to increasingly give
out sub-prime mortgage loans.
Sub-prime mortgage lending can
be described as predatory.139 Borrowers
who are either ﬁnancially unsophisticated
or ﬁnancially desperate for credit may
agree to unjustiﬁed high interest rates,
payments that they cannot afford,
frequent reﬁnancing arrangements,
high and unfair prepayment penalties,
excessively high points or origination
30

fees, and high broker fees. Predatory
lending also involves abusive lending
practices in which the terms of the
loan are inadequately correlated to the
riskiness of the loan.140 In essence,
buyers least able to afford their homes
were charged more than those who
are better able to – the poor paid
more for their houses than the rich.
Moreover, statistics show that minority
buyers who qualiﬁed for conventional
mortgages with better terms were often
steered toward sub-prime mortgages.141
Research has shown that approximately
half of sub-prime borrowers qualify
for conventional loans but are led to
accept sub-prime loans instead. These
borrowers are unaware that they qualify
for lower interest rates because the
lenders withhold the information in
order to swindle minority borrowers into
accepting higher interest rates, insurance
payments, and other fees associated with
the process.142 These buyers were also
more likely to face “creative” ﬁnancing
options that included adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), interest only loans,
and other products that induced the
buyer into the transaction only to get
a substantial increase in mortgage
payments or balloon payments within a
period of a few years.143 These so-called
“teaser mortgage products” provided
short term success and often produced
long term failure.
The interest rates tied to
loans traditionally given to minorities
also demonstrate the existence of
discrimination.
African Americans
typically pay interest rates one-third of
a percent higher than Whites. This
amounts to approximately $11,756 over
the life of a thirty-year $145,000 loan,
and is evidence of predatory lending.
If poorer African American families
are paying a higher monthly mortgage
than wealthier White families for
equal or poorer facilities, then African
Americans are at a disadvantage and
will have less disposable income than
their White counterparts. Additionally,
African Americans in low-income
communities typically live in older,
more dilapidated housing.
This
discrimination further serves to foster

an

African

American

underclass.144

A deeper look into foreclosures
In 2007, home foreclosures
reached 2.2 million, a 75 % increase
from the previous year.145 Many who
lost or were at risk of losing their homes
to foreclosures were unexpected victims.
For example, foreclosures in military
towns and their surrounding towns and
cities are outpacing the national average
four times over.146 Working Americans
with secure employment lost their
homes to foreclosures because they
were unable to make their mortgage
payments, suggesting that much of these
defaults were due to the structure of the
mortgage—many involved adjustable
rates frontloaded with teaser rates that
escalated to amounts that working
families could not manage.
Signiﬁcantly,
as
bad
as
the mortgage
crisis has been, an
estimated 94% to 99% of mortgages
are performing.147 Moreover, it is
estimated that more than 75% of subprime mortgages will perform.148 By
2012, however, 13% of all American
residential loans are projected to end
in foreclosure.149 This would mean
that 87% of mortgage loans would be
performing, but it is the proﬁle of the
13% that compels further review.
Sub-prime lending accounts
for the greatest percentage of home
mortgage foreclosures.150 While subprime mortgages represent only 14 %
of the mortgage loans, they represent
almost 50 % of the foreclosures. The
general consensus is that low-income
and minority homeowners have suffered
disproportionately because they have
participated in the sub-prime lending
market at greater rates than White and
Asian borrowers. In 2006, African
American and Latino communities
accounted for more than 53 and 46 % of
the sub-prime home loans, respectively.151
By 2007, African Americans carried 34%
of high priced mortgages compared
with 10.6% for Whites.152 According to
an analysis of loans reported under the
federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
African Americans were 2.3 times more
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likely to take out sub-prime mortgages
and Latinos twice as likely.153 In 2007,
59 % of all sub-prime loans were in
tracts that were less than 30 % minority
and only 17% were in tracts that were
more than 70 % minority.154
While creditworthiness may be
one reason for the high number of subprime loans in minority communities,
a greater reason appears to be race.155
Despite the CRA’s intent to address
redlining by requiring banks to make
loans in lower income neighborhoods,
it did not require banks to actually be
located in those communities. As a
result, banks typically maintain ofﬁces
and branches in White communities
while lending institutions offering subprime loans are strongly visibility in
minority communities.156 This helps to
explain why minority borrowers eligible
for lower cost loans obtain higher cost
products instead.
A Wall Street Journal study found
that as many as 61 % of all sub-prime
borrowers in 2006 could have qualiﬁed
for more conventional products based
on their credit scores.157 Various ﬁrms
record the states and cities hardest hit
by foreclosures,158 and most of these
states and cities are overwhelmingly
White.159 In other words, while a higher
percentage of people of color than of
Whites assume sub-prime mortgages,
most sub-prime loans overall do not
go to people of color.160 This suggests
that even though sub-prime mortgages
made to minority buyers has affected the
overall foreclosure numbers, something
other than sub-prime lending may be
responsible for the national downturn.
How sub-prime mortgages fueled the economic
crisis of 2008
Since World War II, the
nation’s housing policy has sought to
expand housing opportunities. More
recently, housing policies also aimed
to make mortgages available to poorer
Americans.161 In theory, this policy
recognizes that national wealth is
dependent on the wealth of each of the
nation’s citizens, and it also sought to
address the history of racial and ethnic
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discrimination that affected property
lending and insurance practices, such
as redlining.162 The policy was steeped
in good intention, but many argue that
it forced lenders to abandon sound
business practice in order to lend to the
poor and to minorities, resulting in the
housing bubble burst that brought the
global economy to its knees.163
As discussed earlier, sub-prime
mortgages are characterized as risky,
which means lenders are more likely to
see defaults on sub-prime loans than on
conventional or prime loans. However,
in relation to the economic crisis of 2008,
the sub-prime mortgage was merely
an essential element in the ultimate
collapse. In the early 1990s, a collapse
of the sub-prime market may have been
inconsequential as it accounted for less
than 1% of all mortgage lending.164 By
2005, sub-prime lending grew to 20% of
all mortgage lending.165
Demand for sub-prime loans
increased after the dot-com bubble burst
in 2001. To boost conﬁdence in the
market, the federal government lowered
interest rates, encouraging people to
borrow. For most Americans, homes
represent their largest investment, so
the credit market sought to attract more
home loans. Capital ﬂowed into the
hands of borrowers who in turn bought
more homes. Property values increased,
but some of these values were based on
aggressively unreliable appraisals that
artiﬁcially inﬂated housing valuation and
increased loan amounts. People whose
homes were already mortgaged were
enticed to secure second and even third
liens against their home equity, relying
on these escalating home valuations. In
many instances, borrowers ultimately
owed more than their houses were
worth.
Much of this activity was fueled
by an unquenchable thirst for wealth.
Mortgage brokers and sub-prime lenders
sought out people who would borrow at
exorbitant rates and fees. Theoretically,
these loans would not put brokers and
lenders in grave jeopardy because risk
supposedly goes down as it is spread
out. Instead of the bank holding all of
the risk, the government would share a

signiﬁcant portion of that risk through
FNMA, FHA, and others. At ﬁrst, this
risk-sharing plan appeared to work well,
and securitization emerged as a way to
increase proﬁt while addressing growing
market demands.
Securitization166
Responding to the increasing
interest of the non-depository mortgage
lenders to ﬁnd a source of liquidity
for conventional loans, government
sponsored entities (GSE) began issuing
mortgage-backed securities (MSB)
that passed interest to investors.167
The investors, in turn, found these
securities to be easily transferable on the
market because the GSEs guaranteed
the principal and interest income of
the securities even if the mortgagors
defaulted.168 Private institutions soon
recognized the proﬁtability of these
investments and began pooling home
mortgages but speciﬁcally excluded
home equity loans and sub-prime
mortgages.169 This created a market
niche for private pooling that basically
began in 1977 with Bank of America and
Salomon Brothers.170 Unfortunately, this
securitized mortgage vehicle was based
on a highly unreliable risk assessment
model.171
Beginning in the 1990s,
mortgage ﬁnancing found creative ways
to reach otherwise unqualiﬁed borrowers.
Numerous mortgage products aimed
at attracting ‘untapped’ borrowers
included balloon mortgages, adjustable
rate mortgages, interest only loans, and
others. Initially, these loan products were
made to prime borrowers who carried a
low risk of default. However, extending
securitization to higher risk sub-prime
borrowers became increasingly attractive
for investment banks seeking higher fees
and greater proﬁts.172 Wall Street analysts
produced computer models supposedly
demonstrating that risks associated with
pooling sub-prime debt were comparable
to risks of prime backed securities.
Initially, the models seemed
accurate. Between 2001 and 2005, subprime defaults dropped from 10 % to
5 %. Many borrowers, however, were
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warding off default by getting new
housing equity loans to pay off the
original debt. This created the illusion
that the loans were performing and
were therefore low risk. In actuality, the
borrower’s situation typically worsened,
as new debt was generally higher than
the original high-cost debt. Instead
of avoiding default, the borrower was
simply deferring an increased liability.
Moreover, because securitized subprime mortgages were a relatively new
phenomenon, there was little data with
which to test the computer models. In
other words, the combination of easy
capital and an abundance of available
money far exceeded the underlying goal
of increasing American homeownership.
The new goal was to target as many new
buyers as possible to fuel the unregulated
greed that was consuming Wall and
Main Streets. Based, in large part on
the optimistic models, ninety percent
of securitized sub-prime loans received
the highest rating available: AAA.
Reality ultimately struck and about 50
% of AAA-rated sub-prime securities
defaulted. During this same period of
mirage, collateralized debt obligations
(CDO) were revived as a way to diversify
the mortgage pool by mixing sub-prime
mortgages with asset-backed securities
and credit derivatives. When the smoke
cleared, almost 100% of all AAA CDOs
had at least partially defaulted.173
CDOs and ABSs are secured by
underlying real estate. When the note
defaults, the holder of the CDO or ABS
should be able to sell the underlying
property to recover any ﬁnancial loss.
However, in this new market, the property
is likely to be worth far less than the debt
it secures. Moreover, the housing market
has been stalled by the collapse of the
credit market. The credit market stall
should have been temporary and should
have been reversed with the infusion
of government TARP funds, but it was
neither temporary nor reversed, thus
exacerbating the decline of the housing
market. Inaccessibility to credit has less
to do with housing policy or sub-prime
mortgages and more to do with another
Wall Street invention designed to make
more money for investors. Coupled
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with failing sub-prime market securities,
the failure and potential failure of credit
default swaps would send the global
markets reeling.
Credit Default Swaps and Their Role in the
Credit Collapse
American billionaire Warren
Buffett described speculatively-bought
derivatives as ﬁnancial weapons of mass
destruction.174 A credit default swap
(CDS) is a credit derivative where one
party makes periodic payments to the
other and gets promise of a payoff if a
third party defaults.175 The ﬁrst party gets
credit protection and is called a buyer.
The second party gives credit protection
and is called the seller. The third party is
known as the reference entity. The CDS
is an insurance policy written in favor of
the insured who is not the owner of the
product that is actually being insured.
An investor, also known as the buyer,
can gamble that a company will likely
default and purchase an insurance policy
that pays the investor-buyer money if
the reference entity defaults.176
The underlying theory for the
CDS probably comes from the 1958
Modigliani-Miller theorem,177 which
ﬁnds that the value of a ﬁrm can be
independent of the ﬁrm’s ration of
debt to equity,178 and that swaps and
derivatives ensure the safety of the
ﬁnancial system.179 However, it is a
mathematical computerized ﬁnancial
model created by David Li that is at
the core of the ﬁnancial collapse of
2008.180 Li’s model, which catapulted
the Modigliani-Miller theorem into the
huge derivatives market, was designed
to calculate default correlations by
predicting risk.181 Notwithstanding Li’s
own warnings about important ﬂaws in
his model, investment bankers, beginning
with those at Banker’s Trust and J P
Morgan Chase, relied on the model.182
An estimated $58 trillion in
outstanding CDS liability exists. If this
CDS market collapses, it will produce
consequences far greater than sub-prime
mortgage defaults.183 There will not
be enough money to pay all the claims,
which is why the federal government

is attempting to shore up banks and
insurance companies with cash infusion
and why the cash is not being used to
extend credit. The cash infusions are
being hoarded to pay off the CDS
claims of savvy billionaire investors, not
of sub-prime borrowers. These buyers
who have cashed out (and will cash out
in the future) by insuring products they
didn’t even own have made out like
bandits. Yet, because the CDS market
is completely unregulated,184 it will be far
more difﬁcult to identify these winners
than it was to identify the hedge fund
winners.
Selling Short (Short sales)
Out of the CDS market grew
“the short sale,” another tool investors
used to make unimaginable sums of
money.185 Unlike the traditional “‘long
sale’” where the investor bets that the
company in which she is investing will
prosper, the short seller bets that the
company will fail.186 The short sale has
existed since the seventeenth century and
has remained controversial throughout
its lifetime. Short trading is legal,187 but
the government sought to regulate the
practice, which one congressman called
“the greatest evil that has been permitted
or sanctioned by the Government,” after
the stock market crashed in 1929.188
Until recently, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)
regulated short selling.189 The regultion
prohibited the short sale of an exchangetraded security in a falling market. The
prohibition applied to every transaction
effected on a national securities exchange
and to transactions in certain exchangetraded securities affected in the over-thecounter market.190 On the other side of
the debate, de-regulators suggested that
the short seller is a valuable town crier
in the economic marketplace. Arguing
that the short seller does not cause the
company to fail, but merely identiﬁes
which companies are struggling due to
poor management and overvaluation,
the SEC deregulated the industry on July
2, 2007.
At issue in this article is how
signiﬁcant a role short sales played in the
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current economic crisis. Some investors
viewed mortgage trading as a bubble that
would eventually burst and shorted the
companies—principally banks, insurance
companies, and mortgage companies—
that were investing in this debt. As
debtors began to default and credit
schemes began to unravel, short sellers
proﬁted—some in huge amounts. If the
short sale represents a peculiar industry
of buying and selling borrowed stock, the
credit default swap, which gives investors
unregulated power to insure companies
that they do not own, makes the short
sale seem less menacing.

for so-called toxic debt, they would be
able to make more loans to companies,
consumers, and home buyers. The
current economic catastrophe is rooted
in the failure of these myriad investment
vehicles’ inability to expand the sale of
single family homes to Americans. That
said, a healthy economy cannot survive
purely on credit and consumerism. Nor
can opening the credit markets alone
restore the economy. Credit should be
governed by sensible business principles
that include re-opening mortgage
markets even to higher risk borrowers.

increasing homeownership opportunities
in America. Instead, government policy
should continue to recognize the value
of homeownership to individual and
national wealth. This would require
the nation to continue to address the
barriers to homeownership, particularly
the ﬁnancial barriers, in a comprehensive
and rational way. That said, not every
American needs or is able to own a home.
Financial prudence and good sense
must work in concert with any program
designed to expand homeownership
opportunities.

Part IV: Looking for Solutions

Addressing the absence of Credit

You got Wall Street
ﬁrms, Bear Stearns,
Lehman
Brothers.
You got insurance
companies like AIG.
Merrill lost a ton of
money
on
this…
Everybody’s lost a ton
of money.
They’re
supposed to be the
smartest investors in
the world. And they
did it to themselves.
They blew themselves
up.194

The government has tried to
stimulate the ﬁnancial markets and
reinvigorate lending, but the credit
market remains closed. Instead, banks
are putting money received from the
government into reserves in anticipation
of CDS claims. While estimates of
potential CDS claims continue to rise,
it is likely they are in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Chase Bank alone is
involved in over 4 trillion dollars in CDS
investments.198 At these rates, there will
never be enough money to stimulate the
ﬁnancial markets back into lending again.
This leaves the government as the major
source of loans, and there are a number
of government-backed programs in
place to provide the funding necessary
to support homeownership.
In order to stop the market’s
ﬁnancial bleeding, regulators should put
a halt to CDSs. There should also be a
time-speciﬁc requirement that all holders
of CDS instruments must report their
holdings. In this way, potential liability
can be calculated and the proper amount
of reserves needed to compensate can
be set aside. Since CDSs terminate after
time, the markets will also know how long
the potential loss exists. In the event the
CDS continues as an investment vehicle,
the law prohibiting regulation should be
overturned so that the CDS market will
be at least as transparent as the overall
investment market.199

Credit
A weak American credit market
substantially affects the overall health of
international economies. The American
consumer uses credit to pay for homes
and education in the U.S., but also for
goods imported from abroad. American
businesses rely on credit to conduct,
maintain, and expand operations both
domestically and abroad. When lenders
fail or refuse to lend, people around the
globe suffer.
One of the reasons banks are
unwilling to lend is because they fear
that toxic debt, otherwise described as
potential CDSs and short sale liability,
is yet to be fully identiﬁed or assessed.
Banks are hoarding money in reserve to
defray potential losses in debt. Generally,
a bank’s equity-to-debt ratio is about one
dollar in equity to support every twenty
dollars in debt. The SEC permitted
investment banks to have a 1:30 equityto-debt ratio.191 To assess the accuracy
of the ratio and therefore the risk,
banks rely on rating agencies. When
the rating agencies incorrectly rate high
risk ABSs, CDOs, and sub-prime MBSs
as AAA, thereby severely discounting
the risk, lenders are left seriously
undercapitalized.192 The government’s
infusion of capital into these banks,
while bolstering the reserves needed
to ward off potential liability, has not
adequately contributed to re-opening the
credit markets.193
In other words, if the banks
did not have to provide reserve funds
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Numerous factors contributed to
the economic collapse of 2008. The subprime mortgage market was one factor
but was not the only culprit. Indeed,
losses related to high risk mortgages are
dwarfed by those related to derivatives
and securitization. According to Frank
Partnoy, “we wouldn’t be in any trouble
right now if we had just had underlying
investments in mortgages. We wouldn’t
be in any trouble right now.”195 In fact,
even though foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages are much higher that
foreclosure rates on prime mortgages,
some 80 % of sub-prime loans are
still performing, and sub-prime loans
continue to enable borrowers to own
homes, increase wealth, and convert their
sub-prime loans to conventional ones.196
If Partnoy is correct (and the
numbers reﬂect that he is),197 it would
be foolhardy to abandon the goal of
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Speciﬁc Financial Remedies: No need to reinvent the wheel
Various existing government
programs provide ﬁnancial ﬁxes through
subsidies that ﬁll the gap between funds
needed to close sales and funds potential
buyers have to purchase homes.200
These programs provide down payment
assistance, tax credits,201 expanded funds
to the secondary mortgage market202 and
various ﬁnancial incentives to private
homebuilding and ﬁnancing entities.203
There is signiﬁcant value in these
programs, but additional government
money to support these programs
where few alternatives exist could serve
as a much needed ‘TARP’ for ordinary
citizens.

The Land Trust
Land trusts are used to protect
natural resources.204 While the land trust
movement has grown tremendously
since its inception more than one
hundred years ago, it remains principally
a conservation and environmental
protection tool.205 The land trust concept
can easily be expanded to include the goal
of protecting affordable housing stock
and homeownership opportunities.206
Land trust corporations207
may acquire land in fee simple for
the charitable or public purpose of
providing affordable homeownership
opportunities.208 Technically, the trust
would acquire the land and retain
ownership of it,209 and the homeowner
would purchase the house itself but
not the underlying land. This option
could be particularly helpful in gentriﬁed
communities where land values, property
taxes, and insurance costs are so high
that homeownership can become
unaffordable.210
Under this option, homeowners
would pay the taxes assessed solely on
the house value, while property taxes
assessed on the land value would be
exempt or paid by the trust.211 Similarly,
homeowner insurance would be based
on the cost of replacing the house
and not on the price of the land. The
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homeowner could acquire the land
over time at a low purchase price (preescalated or modiﬁed escalation value)
and even share proﬁts from the sale of the
property with the trust.212 The ﬁnancial
gain to the homeowner at the sale of
the property would be based on the
number of years the property would be
held as affordable. A homeowner could
sell the property to another qualiﬁed
buyer without penalty allowing the land
use restrictions to transfer to the new
owner. On the other hand, a homeowner
who sold the property to a fair market
purchaser could share some proﬁt from
the sale with the trust. The amount of
proﬁt realized would be related to the
number of years the homeowner owned
the property under the affordability
restriction.213 Moreover, an incentive to
participate in such a transaction could
be to permit the initial buyer to share in
some of the appreciated land value as
well as the value of the house itself.
The sales agreement between
the trust and the homeowner can provide
for an affordable housing payment
to the trust. Rather than securing a
sub-prime mortgage, the qualiﬁed
buyer would contract for a loan that
would be affordable. Not only might
this affordable housing program help
improve the buyer’s ﬁnancial condition,
but the homeowner will pay a return to
the public upon sale.
Tax Abatement and Exemption Programs
Property taxes are calculated
based on the assessed value of the
property and are commonly described
as ad valorem taxes. Affordable housing
developments are often constructed
on land with low valuation. Low value
appraisals are essential for ensuring low or
affordable sales prices. Pre-development
residents generally pay lower taxes
than do residents who move in postdevelopment, when property values for
the area have risen. Affordable housing
developments tend to address blighted
conditions, upgrade the community,
and generally increase the value of new
residences as well as existing ones.214 As
more housing is developed and a more

stable community is established, values
continue to increase. The double-edged
sword of development is that it could tax
existing residents as well as newcomers
out of their homes.215 This is especially
true of development near downtown
locations where land values may increase
dramatically and quickly.216
Effectively addressing the
property tax problem is challenging.
One option is for the owner to sell at
higher value, enjoying the windfall of
equity build up in the land since it was
purchased. This is not necessarily averse
to the public interest of building wealth in
historically impoverished communities.217
However, the drawback to electing the
windfall option is the potential reduction
in economic and racial diversity in the
community and the displacement and
replacement of longtime community
residents. This is commonly referred
to as gentriﬁcation—the replacement
of lower income residents with higher
income residents through increased
property taxes and sale prices.
A second option tempers the
ﬁrst option’s market-driven approach.
A municipality or developer can impose
restrictive affordability covenants that
run with land purchased under the
affordable housing program. Presuming
that the program is designed to increase
affordable housing stock and expand
homeownership
opportunities
to
historical renters, the covenant would
be designed to retain affordability for an
express term and could be written in a
way to permit the homeowner to recover
a share of the equity that would be less
than the windfall of option one. Under
this second option, the homeowner may
sell the property at a price higher than
was paid based on the higher valuation
but may keep only a percentage of the
proﬁt based on the length of time he
or she owned the property. This meets
two goals: increasing homeowner wealth
and retaining an affordable housing fund
even if the speciﬁc housing stock is no
longer affordable.
A third option is tax abatement.
Commonly used by municipalities to
attract business enterprises, it could
also be used to encourage economically
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diverse communities and reduce the
displacement of residents who have
no viable relocation alternatives. Tax
abatement and tax exemption programs
are legislatively-established measures for
shifting the burden of property taxes away
from a target taxpayer population.218 The
general purpose of the tax exemption
is to encourage publicly desired
objectives.219 A cost-beneﬁt analysis
should be done to determine which
groups will be impacted positively, which
groups will be affected negatively, and
whether a complete or partial exemption
is or should be available.220
Tax
abatements are also ﬁnancing tools that
may be used to revitalize economicallyAbatements
depressed areas.221
commonly forgive all or a portion of
property taxes for a speciﬁed period of
time. Tax abatements are often used to
attract business communities with the
goal of creating jobs and encouraging
community vitality.222 It is unclear how
beneﬁcial such business abatements have
actually been in the past, but as part of a
comprehensive redevelopment program,
they could increase the level and speed
of a community’s revitalization.223
Tax Credits
Tax credit programs provide
incentives for tax-burdened entities
to participate in low-income housing
programs. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
established the low income housing tax
credit and was designed to increase the
number of affordable housing rental
units in the United States.224 It is often
criticized,225 but there is also a growing
movement to expand the program to
include low-income homeownership
tax credits.226 Among the proposals is a
low-income second mortgage tax credit
that would encourage homeownership
by lowering down payment and closing
costs and by reducing housing costs in
general.227
Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
Tax increment ﬁnancing (TIF) is
a mechanism by which local government
provides homeownership opportunities.
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TIF allows local governments to ﬁnance
improvements, in infrastructure for
example, in an effort to attract business
redevelopment in a target area.228 TIF
relies on property value increases
and property tax revenue to pay for
community revitalization that could
include redeveloping or rehabilitating
deteriorated areas of a city, facilitating
the construction of low-to-moderate
income housing, promoting economic
development, and providing employment
opportunities.229
Addressing Creditworthiness
Some potential buyers who
have adequate income to pay the house
note and costs are still not creditworthy
under traditional lending criteria.230
Though helpful, programs designed
to clean buyers’ credit histories are not
designed to monitor buyers’ future
credit habits. A three-part program that
allows the purchaser to buy the home
during the pending credit “cleanup” will
likely yield better results. Under this
option, the buyer would qualify for the
program based on income and evidence
of ﬁnancial stability. Those with less
than stellar credit ratings will have to
participate in a credit counseling and
cleaning program during the ﬁrst year
of homeownership as a condition of the
mortgage subsidy or other assistance.
Finally, the buyer will agree to a wage
garnishment plan that hedges against the
risk posed by the buyer’s limited credit
worthiness.
It may also be possible to divert
attention from the traditional house to
a less expensive form of housing like
the modular housing that was popular
in places like Levittown during the post
war era.231 Other forms of construction
could also be made available, as well as
smaller cottages and bungalows that
support lower construction and sales
prices.
Standard ﬁnancing programs
need to address the cost of constructing
homes and its effect on affordability.232
In markets where housing prices fall
below the average, demand tends to be
very high.233 These markets consist of

the working poor who do not qualify for
public housing but do not make enough
money to purchase a home. While
no person should be pressured into
homeownership, the opportunity could
be made available for those Americans
who desire to be homeowners. Often,
construction costs limit the accessibility
of this market in several ways. Contractors
who build in the affordable market
already realize limited proﬁt margins
that discourage entrepreneurial interest.
They are not equipped to reduce the
sales prices of homes to meet the needs
of this forgotten market.234 The working
poor generally do pay for housing and its
amenities in the form of rent and utility
payments, but they often do not qualify
for homeownership opportunities at
rates comparable to rent.
Foreclosure
Access to credit does not always
portend success as a homeowner. Some
will lose their home to foreclosure.
There are three sources of risk that
commonly lead to mortgage payment
terminations:235 interest-rate related
reﬁnancing, default, and moving.236 For
various reasons, higher risk loans are
more likely to be affected by mortgage
payment factors. Market conditions
may reduce the homebuyer’s ability
to maintain mortgage payments. For
example, a slow market may affect
the owner’s ability to resell the home
and move unless the seller is willing to
accept a loss. Clearly, selling at a loss
undermines the home purchase as a tool
for building wealth.237 On the other
hand, high risk homeowners in a fast
market are commonly impacted by the
rising costs, including increased property
taxes, associated with the house, but
such costs can be offset by the sale of
the property at its enhanced value. Here,
the homebuyer is forced from her home
as a “victim” of a gentriﬁed community.
While such displacement does not
necessarily mean ﬁnancial detriment to
the homeowner, it could signiﬁcantly
affect the maintenance and availability
of affordable housing.238 Foreclosure
then looms as a potential threat to the
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affordable homebuyer.
Addressing the Roots of Barriers to
Homeownership Comprehensively
Capital and access to capital
signiﬁcantly impact a family’s ability
to purchase a home. As short term
remedies, down payment assistance,
mortgage buy downs, and other subsidies
are very helpful but should be employed
as part of a long-term plan. Education
is internationally recognized as the single
most powerful tool against poverty,239
yet illiteracy in America is believed to be
at least 20 %.240 Since the United States
provides access to public education, it
seems infeasible that so many Americans
are uneducated or undereducated.242
Studies show that when poor people are
relocated from depressed communities
to more mainstream communities, they
tend to develop and maintain a new
culture supportive of upward mobility
and education.243 Thus, concentrated
communities of poor people limit
homeownership, and any potential
solution should address racial, cultural,
and economic diversity as part of its
design.
Conclusion
There
is
substantial
reason to maintain a strong policy
of
homeownership in America.
Homeownership is the primary means
of developing wealth for most American
families. When whole groups of people,
deﬁned often by their race, are denied
access to this source of wealth, it sustains
an economic division that retards
national growth and development. As
the American population is increasingly
dominated by this group of have-nots,
the impact of poverty on the United
States and world economy is clear.
For over six decades, the United
States has promoted a policy favoring
safe, decent, and sanitary housing for its
citizens. For much of that time, however,
homeownership was reserved for
Whites, while signiﬁcant barriers existed
for African Americans who wanted to
own their own homes. These barriers
36

often closed the door to homeownership
altogether for African Americans. In
other cases, the cost was so high as to
have a deleterious impact on wealth,
even for those African Americans who
owned homes. During the last decade,
the policy has shifted to encourage
homeownership, particularly for African
Americans. Regardless of whether this
shift occurred because the nation ﬁnally
recognized that African Americans
were being denied an important vehicle
to prosperity, because of a desire for
racial equality, or because of investor
greed, the shift did produce an increase
in African American homeownership.
At any rate, recognition of the goal of
homeownership is meaningless without
an assault on the remaining barriers to
reaching that goal. If the goal is to be
achieved, solutions must be aggressively
pursued.
The current world economic
state has multiplied the challenges
America faces.
Many of the last
decade’s ﬁnancial practices have failed
in catastrophic ways, and recovery is
expected to be very slow. Nevertheless,
the role of the mortgage market and
of the sub-prime loan in this calamity
is inﬁnitely small, so the American
policy of homeownership should not
be reversed. We should ensure that all
Americans will share in the economic
recovery and that the history of disparity
will be reversed. An important part
of that recovery is the revival of the
housing market and the development
of strategies making housing more
affordable. Our efforts will be maximized
if we pursue a comprehensive program
that meets short-term needs but also
addresses long-term cures.
T h e
government must employ meaningful
regulation to help identify the extent
of the continuing CDS liability. Every
buyer, holder, broker or seller of a CDS
should be given a limited period of time
to report its existence and its potential
liability.
Companies or individuals
who fail to self report within the time
period should be subjected to speciﬁed
penalties. The ﬂedgling private lending
marketplace should be supplemented
with direct government mortgages,

and the government should work with
the private marketplace to ensure that
lending practices are sound. Mortgage
lending programs should be developed
that permit higher risk borrowers to
buy non–traditional, and affordable,
homes under more traditional ﬁnancing
structures. Public and private policies
must be in place to maintain reasonable
and realistic property valuations.
Programs that include features like
wage garnishment or mortgage escrow
agreements to help ensure loan repayment
should be considered. The costs of
affordable housing can be reduced in
various ways, one of which is through
waivers of income generating municipal
and regulatory fees. Also, historically
un- and underserved communities can
be targeted for capital improvements,
particularly in infrastructure. Lower
cost building product alternatives, such
as prefabricated or modular homes, can
be used. Land banks and/or land trusts
can also reduce the cost of housing. The
sources of low-cost loans (investments),
such as pension funds, should be
identiﬁed. Mixed-use and mixed-income
residential developments should be
encouraged, programs that provide down
payment assistance should be continued,
and predatory lending should be reduced
while shoring up fair sub-prime products.
Finally, homeownership illiteracy should
be reduced via, for example, continued
education components as part of loan
requirements or community-based
campaigns to inform target populations
of the various programs available. In the
long term, we must bridge the income
gap between Asian Americans, Anglo
Americans, African Americans, and
Latinos, especially in those situations
where the gap can only be explained
by race. We must reverse the trend of
school drop outs and public education
failure toward a trend of achievement
and productivity. Finally, we must enact
inclusive zoning laws and eliminate the
myth of the inherently substandard
African
American
residential
community.
The impact of a wealthier
nation will be felt by all Americans. The
fact that government policies denied
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access to wealth to its citizens because
of their race makes it important not

only to retain its policy of expanded
homeownership opportunities, but to

couple it with speciﬁc strategies to reach
a fair and equitable result.
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